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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of social integration on cooperative
behavior. We show that if the social network shows assortative mixing
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1then conditional cooperation is an equilibrium strategy for altruistic
subjects with a high degree of social integration.We provide experi-
mental evidence on the relationship between individuals’ position in a
social network and their contributions in a public good game.
Keywords: public good game, social networks, conditional coop-
eration
JEL Class.: C91, D64, C72, H41.
1M o t i v a t i o n
The experimental literature on linear Public Good Games (PGG hereafter)
has documented several regularities: i) on average subjects contribute posi-
tive amounts even though Nash equilibrium contributions are zero, ii)c o n -
tributions decline over time, and iii) there is heterogeneity between subjects
in their contribution levels. This pattern of behavior has been systematically
observed (see Davis and Holt, 1993 and Ledyard, 1995).1
The initial willingness to contribute can be due to conditional cooper-
ation —subjects who cooperate as long as others cooperate too, strategic
1Zelmer (2003) analyzes the eﬀect on contributions of marginal per capita returns,
communication, positive framing, heterogeneous endowments, experienced participants
and other variables.
2signalling or, simply, to individuals’ social preferences. Learning eﬀects, the
frustration of players’ attempts to sustain cooperation and backward induc-
tion arguments (endgame eﬀects) are commonly used to explain the decline
of contributions over time. Heterogeneity of behavior has been attributed to
subjects’ diﬀerent types (conditional cooperators, free-riders,...).2
In this paper we analyze the impact of social integration on the level
of contributions in a PGG and provide experimental evidence on this re-
lationship. To capture an individual’s social type we use two measures of
integration within his/her (university class)3 social network:4 in—degree (the
number of subjects who call him a friend) and betweenness (a measure of
centrality/importance of the subject within the network). Both variables
are obtained through a coordination game (step 1) that reveals the existing
social network.
Then, we explore whether a subject’s network attributes are related to his
cooperative behavior in a context where private incentives would indicate not
2See Anderson et al (1998), Andreoni (1988, 1995), Brandts and Schram (2001), Goeree
et al (2002), Houser and Kurzban (2002), Palfrey and Prisbey (1996, 1997), Levati (2002)
and Keser and van Winden (2000), among others.
3We intentionally chose an existing social network. For this purpose, we did the re-
cruitment process in a university classroom. A standard recruitment procedure would not
provide us with the necessary density of network connections.
4An excellent textbook to introduce social network measures is Jackson (2008).
.
3to do so. In particular, we check the relationship between social integration
and behavior in a linear public good game (step 2). We ﬁn das t r o n gp o s i t i v e
relation between subjects’ contributions and social connections.
We propose a theoretical framework to interpret these results. In our
model individual diﬀerences in contributions observed in the initial period of
the PGG are related to the subjects’ position in a social network, together
with the fact that this network shows assortative mixing. Subjects have social
preferences but each subject values the payoﬀ of other player only if they are
socially connected. In a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium players may
contribute diﬀerently depending on their social preferences and their position
in the network. Moreover, their behavior is also determined by the observed
signals, which implies a decline in contributions over time.
The conditions for the separating equilibrium in our game exclude strate-
gic signalling, that is contributing in the initial periods of the game just to
induce others to cooperate and then obtain a higher payoﬀ;i no u rm o d e l
conditional cooperation is an equilibrium strategy only for altruistic sub-
jects with a high degree of social integration.5 This theoretical framework
is consistent with previous experimental evidence showing heterogeneity in
5However, in a pooling equilibrium we might observe a decline in contributions due to
strategic signalling behavior.
4the behavior of subjects playing PGG and relates these diﬀerences to the
subjects’ diﬀerent levels of social integration.6 Our analysis emphasizes the
importance of peer eﬀects in the underlying social network.
In the heart of our model, we take as given that all subjects are socially
concerned. More speciﬁcally, we consider that individuals care about their
linked mates. The fact that some agents are more socially skilled (have more
links) than others is determinant in their attitude towards cooperation. In
particular, we model players as being uninformed about their opponents’
identity. Socially skilled players interpret observed behavior as a signal of
their rivals’ type: after a cooperative signal they assume that the other player
is socially skilled like them. This is a consequence of a positive degree cor-
relation in the social network: agents with the same social skills tend to be
connected among them.7
Conditional cooperation has been considered as a result of preferences
for fairness, like inequity aversion or reciprocity (Fischbacher, Gachter and
Fehr, 2000).8 We show that even if subjects did not have any preference for
6González, González-Farías and Levatti (2005) ﬁnd that 55% of the subjects playing
PGG can be regarded as conditional cooperators.
7Thus cooperative behavior from social agents is not only the result of having a friend
as a rival with higher probability, but it is due to the fact that socially similar agents tend
to behave homogeneously.
8See also Sugden (1984) Andreoni (1995), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) Anderson, Go-
5fairness, in equilibrium we could observe a conditional cooperation behavior.
Here our subjects are not concerned about strangers but about their actual
partners.
Ours is a very speﬁcic model which ﬁts in the recent literature in network
games.9 In this literature some papers have restrictedd their attention to
games with complete information where each player’s payoﬀ is determined by
the actions accurred in the neighborhood (for instance, see Calvó-Armengol
and Zenou 2004, Ballester et al. 2006, 2008, Bramoullé and Kranton 2007
or Ballester and Calvó-Armengol 2008). Our paper is closer to the novel
approach developed in Galeoti et al. (2007). They analyze general network
games in an incomplete information setting, where each player’s utility is
determined by his neighbor’s (and his own) actions. In our model, each
player’s payoﬀ is also dependent on the actions of his opponent, whether he
is a friend or not. The fact that the rival is his neighbor alters (increases)
his payoﬀ.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical
framework, to illustrate the idea that social preferences and the position in
eree and Holt (1998) Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
9For a thorough analysis of networks in economics, see Jackson (2008).
.
6the network aﬀect the equilibrium strategies and imply a declining pattern
of contributions over time in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In Section
3 we describe the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 contains
the empirical results and our interpretation based on the model. Section 5
concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Agents in the set N = {1,...,n} a r ee m b e d d e di nan e t w o r kg,w h e r egij =1
if agents i and j are friends and gij =0otherwise. We assume that g is
symmetric, that is, gij = gji for all i and j.10 Let
Ni = {j ∈ N\{i} : gij =1 }
be the set of agents that are neighbors of i in g,a n dki = |Ni|.
We model a situation with incomplete information in which the informa-
tion privately available to each agent i is his set of neighbors Ni.T w oa g e n t s
are randomly selected to play a game Γ (that we describe below) and none
10This is without loss of generality. We assume this property for simplicity and because
actual friendship networks, like those that we deal with in this paper, are highly symmetric.




be the probability that a random opponent j of i has at least k neighbors,










We are implicitly assuming that this probability is independent of the identity
of i and his neighborhood Ni. Nevertheless, this does not imply that this
independence holds if we condition on the opponent being an actual friend
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be the probability that player i with ki n e i g h b o r si sm a t c h e dt oaf r i e n dj
with less than k neighbors. From now on, we will refer to agents with at least
8k neighbors as "socially skilled", while the rest will form the set of "socially
unskilled" agents.
Once the two agents have been randomly matched, they are called upon
to play the following two-stage game, Γ, where at each stage both play-
ers (labeled 1 and 2) choose simultaneously whether to cooperate or defect:
at
1,a t
2 ∈ {C,D} for t =1 ,2.11
Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we will assume that subjects are en-
dowed with other-regarding preferences, that is, they care about others’ wel-
fare.12 Each player i =1 ,2 receives a monetary payoﬀ Pt
i (at
1,a t
2) at stage t.
























































where α ≥ 0 is a scalar, assumed to be common to all agents,13 that measures
t h ed e g r e eo fc o n c e r no fi towards his friends (kindness).
11We may also interpret this situation as follows. Several pairs of agents are selected
randomly from a large population and each pair has to play a 2−player game. If this
population is large, we obtain strategic independence across games.
12We do not deal with the motivations behind social preferences. We just assume indi-
viduals are socially—concerned.
13In our framework we assume that all agents are equally socially concerned. It is the
fact that an agent is more social (has more connections) that will determine his higher
concern about eﬃcient outcomes.
9We assume the following tables of utilities.14
CD





if gij =1 otherwise
Γ is a Bayesian game where player i’s type is given by Ni. We restrict
ourselves to strategies where each player’s strategy depends on the size of his
neighborhood ki. Then, player i’s (pure) strategy is deﬁned by the following
mappings at stages 1 and 2:
a
1
i : {0,...,n− 1} → {C,D}
a
2
i : {0,...,n− 1}×{ C,D}
2 → {C,D}.
Now, we characterize a separating equilibrium where agents’ strategies
only depend on the size of their neighborhood and on the observed ﬁrst
stage action by the other player.
Proposition 1 If there exists k ∈ {1,...,n− 1} such that for all i
14This is a particular Bayesian version of the prisoner’s dilemma, which has the same
structure as a public good game with two players.










































































C if ki ≥ k















C if ki ≥ k and a1
j = C
D otherwise
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 shows that in a separating equilibrium the socially skilled
agents follow a conditional cooperation strategy (continue cooperating until
11the opponent defects), while the socially unskilled players behave as free-
riders. The experimental literature on the PGG has found evidence of this
heterogeneous behavior of players.15 Proposition 1 rationalizes the observed
behavior in terms of the social types of players and the peer eﬀects in game
Γ.
The conditions for a separating equilibrium can be interpreted as follows:
1. Condition (1) ensures that a socially unskilled agent will defect in the
second period after observing C, through a lower probability of part-
nership with a friend. Condition (3) aﬀects the behavior of a socially
skilled agent in the second stage after observing C.
2. Expression (2) determines the incentives for the unskilled to defect in
the ﬁrst round. This condition implies, ﬁrst, that k should be above
the median of the degree distribution.16 This is reasonable: the class
of socially skilled agents cannot be too large, otherwise the unskilled
would be willing to cooperate in the ﬁrst round, with a high probability
of ﬁnding a cooperator to cheat on in the next round. Our equilibrium
condition excludes this type of strategic behavior by the socially un-
15See for instance González et al (2005).
16This is shown in lemma 2 in Appendix 2.
12skilled players.




≤ 1/2 for ki < k: unskilled
agents should not be too connected among them; otherwise they would
cooperate in the second round.
It turns out that the restrictions on r and q for the unskilled agents
become more demanding as k decreases and gets closer to the median
(as the socially skilled class grows). In this case, the two social classes
have a considerable size. The incentives of unskilled agents must be
such that they have a small probability of social matching so that the
overall chance of meeting a friend will be small and defection will follow
in the ﬁrst round.
3. The implications of (4) are similar. As in the case of unskilled agents,
the probability q of being matched to a socially unskilled should not




≤ 1/2. On the other hand, in order to ensure





of being a friend of an unskilled partner.
As opposed to socially unskilled agents, condition (4) becomes more
stringent as k grows. If the socially unskilled group grows very large,
13the only way to induce cooperation of the few skilled is to be socially
linked to a relatively high number of unsocial friends.
4. The set of conditions (1) to (4) is related to the existence of some
correlation in the degrees of the nodes. In words, positive assortativity
is reﬂected in the fact that socially skilled agents should be more likely
to be linked to socially skilled agents than to the unskilled. This is
clearly implied by the equilibrium conditions in proposition 1.
5. Our equilibrium requires a kindness parameter α ≥ 1/2.T h i s m a k e s
it a dominant strategy to cooperate if a player is certain about being
matched to a friend in game Γ. Although this may seem a strong
requirement, note that in a more general model the presence of more
than two players should relax the one-to-one kindness requirements at
equilibrium.
O u rs i m p l er e s u l tg o e sa l o n gt h es a m el i n e sa st h eg e n e r a lﬁndings in
Galeotti et al. (2007) - non-decreasing Bayesian equilibria in games where
there is degree complementarity. Here, we focus on equilibrium perfection
of a simple two-stage game, where the payoﬀ of each player depends on the
actions of the opponent, event if he is a not a friend.
14In game Γ we have assumed a particular payoﬀ structure and two play-
ers. This framework may not ﬁt all the situations but it illustrates the idea
that peer eﬀects could be important for experimental research. The posi-
tion in a social network may aﬀect a player’s behavior when he interacts
(anonymously) with other players. This setup is often found in laboratory
experiments. Even though the experimenter may want to test something ap-
parently unrelated to the underlying social network, he should be concerned
by the social links between subjects and their heterogeneity in this respect.
An implication of our results is that the recruitment process should not
ignore the existing social networks. It is not unlikely that subjects (for ex-
ample, university students) are heterogeneous in their network position and
potentially this will aﬀect their decisions in the laboratory. This heterogene-
ity is probably being controlled for in many experiments but it is probably
a better strategy to recognize explicitly the potential eﬀect of the networks
and tailor the recruitment process accordingly (see also footnote 3).
To highlight the idea that their position in social networks may aﬀect
the behavior of players even when they are randomly matched, we have
considered that the driving force for cooperation is just kindness to friends.
Of course, there are other important factors like inequality aversion that have
15been extensively explored in the literature.17
Although simple, our model allows us to contribute important elements
to the discussion of the experimental evidence in PGG.
• First, agents are aware of their pattern of relationships before the game
starts and do not know the identity of their actual opponents in the
game. This has strategic implications on their behavior regarding the
chance of meeting a friend behind the computer. These implications
become more apparent as the network displays higher degree correla-
tion.
• Second, we show a simple argument of why socially skilled agents can
behave in a more altruistic way in the game. The reason is that, even
though every agent is assumed to have social preferences and the same
concern for his friends, a player with more friends feels more willing to
cooperate because of the higher likelihood of facing a friend as a partner
in the lab. Moreover, the equilibrium has the property of declining
contributions of the socially unskilled and of betrayed social players.18
17See Fischbacher, Gachter and Fehr (2000).
18Andreoni (1995) relates the decline in contributions to the frustrated attempts to
sustain cooperation.
16• Third, we show that the structure of the network may allow for certain
kind of equilibria where each agent’s behavior is shaped by the number
of neighbors he has, allowing him to signal his type to his opponent.
In particular, networks that display a higher degree of assortativity
seem more likely to allow agents to adopt this separating behavior at
equilibrium.
Finally, our results require certain conditions which may or may not hold
in laboratory experiments. In particular, we required some assortative mixing
in the social network. To check whether our results have some empirical
relevance we run a PGG with anonymous partners (not necessarily neighbors
in the network). We test whether the underlying network has an inﬂuence
on the behavior of subjects.
3 Experimental design & preliminaries
The experiment was conducted in two stages: a network elicitation phase
and a PGG.
Step 1: Network elicitation
71 ﬁrst year undergraduate students in Business Administration at the
17Universidad de Granada —with no previous exposure to Game Theory— par-
ticipated in a network elicitation experiment in a single session19 held on
April 27th, 2007. Subjects were invited to reveal their class friends’ names,
together with an index of friendship “strength” (from acquaintance to good
friend). According to the mechanism, subjects were rewarded with a ﬁxed
prize of 5 euros as follows a) if a randomly selected (bidirectional) link was
corresponded and the revealed strengths suﬃciently close or b) when they
did not name anybody.20
In contrast to Leider et al. (2007) —a powerful experimental device to
elicit the maximum number of existing links (and even distant neighbors)
within a given social network21— our approach captures close relationships.
It does not give incentives to name many friends but only close friends. If
the subject decides not to name anybody, then his friends (those who named
him) will lose the prize. Hence, a subject will name a friend when he is pretty
sure his friend is going to name him and he values his relationship enough
(since he can always get the prize by not naming anyone).
19In order to maximize the number of links we run the experiment within a regular
class after students ﬁn i s h e dt h e i rt e a c h i n g( s e ef o o t n o t e3 ) .A tt h es a m et i m ew er u nt h e
experiment in two classes: A and B. This experiment uses data from class B.
20See Brañas-Garza et al. (2007) for details on the properties of this elicitacion mecha-
nism. See also Appendix 1.
21Goeree et al (2006) provides a diﬀerent approach, based on a survey, which also yields
good results.
18On average, subjects sent 2.25 links (st. dev. 1.84)a n dr e c e i v e d2.26 links
(st. dev. 1.82); 70% of the elicited links were bidirectional (corresponded).22
Moreover, 17% of the subjects did not receive any link and 18% did not send
any link. Betweenness centrality is, on average, 4.50 (st. dev. 3.44). Main
data are available in Appendix 5.3 (Table A1).
Women received, on average, 2.71 links (st. dev. 2.01) while men received
1.87 links (st. dev. 1.60). Mann Whitney test supports this gender bias
(ZMW = −1.78;p =0 .07). Diﬀerences among females and males are even
stronger for centrality; betweenness was 5.34 (st. dev. 3.38)f o rw o m e na n d
3.82 (st. dev. 3.37)f o rm e n( ZMW = −1.98;p =0 .04).
Figure 1 shows the histogram for in-degree.23 16% of the subjects did not
receive any link, around 20% of them received 1, 2 or 3 links and less than
20% were named by 4 or more players.
If we deﬁne as ’very popular’ those members of the network named by
ﬁve or more people, we see that there are few very popular individuals. This
is the ﬁrst important feature of our social network: A small fraction of the
members of the network are very popular.
22This is what we assumed in our model. See also footnote 10.
23We used in-degree instead of out-degree because —taking into account how the network
is elicited— the subject cannot inﬂuence it.
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Figure 2 shows the network’s graph. Note that the network is formed by
a number of clusters weakly connected.
A salient characteristic of our network is assortativity, that is, a preference
to attach to others who are similar (the nodes in the network that have many
connections tend to be connected to other nodes with many connections). In
social networks we would expect that highly connected individuals tend to
be connected to other high degree members24 and indeed this assortative
mixing is observed for our network participants. We focus on in—degree and
check whether those who are named by a lot of friends are connected with
individuals with larger in—degree.
24Newman (2002) provides evidence that social networks are often assortatively mixed,
while technological and biological networks tend to be disassortative.
20Figure 2: The elicited Network
Figure 3 shows this assortative mixing. The X- a x i ss h o w st h es u b j e c t s
sorted by the number of friends who named them (in-degree =0 ,1,...,8)
whereas the Y - a x i sc o u n t st h ea v e r a g ei n - d e g r e eo ft h e i rr e s p e c t i v ef r i e n d s :
clearly, popular individuals are linked with popular individuals. This is the
second important feature of our social network: it shows assortative mixing.
In sum, the network obtained with our elicitation mechanism has two
features that we want to highlight:
• As m a l lf r a c t i o no ft h es u b j e c t si sh i g h l yc o n n e c t e d .





























On May 31th, 2007, 48 of the “network members” participated in a
PGG.25 They played a 4-person linear public good game (anonymous part-
ners)f o rﬁve periods (12 groups). Each period subjects were given an endow-
ment of 100 coins of 2 euro cents each. They were asked to make a decision
on how much to allocate to a private account and how much to allocate to a
public account.26 After each round subjects were informed about their proﬁt
25This second session was run one month after the network elicitation session and only
50 subjects (out of the 71 attending the ﬁrst session) showed up. Two of them could not
participate since we needed groups of 4 people for the PGG, so that ﬁnally we were left
with 48 subjects.
26Contributions were expressed in number of coins, thus, they were integer numbers
between 0 and 100, cit ∈ [0,100]. Participants were informed that any money allocated
to the private account they could keep for themselves, and this independently of other
subjects’ actions, while all the money allocated to the public account (the sum of the
22(private + public accounts earnings). Each participant earned the sum of
payoﬀs obtained in the ﬁve periods (11.3 euros on average).
On average, subjects contributed 39.29 (st. dev. 36.53)27 with a minimum
(maximum) contribution of 0 (100) coins. Figure 4 shows contributions in
round 1. Contributions decline over time and there is heterogeneity in the
subjects contribution levels. Main data are available in Appendix 5.3 (Table
A1).























0 20 40 60 80 100
cont1
money allocated by the four members of the group) would be multiplied by 1.5 and then
it would be divided equally among the four members. For details see Brañas—Garza &
Espinosa (2008).
27This is not very diﬀerent from the average contribution in other PGG experiments.
234 Results
In this section we use the experimental data obtained through the network
elicitation device to establish the "social type" of each player. Each player is
characterized by in-degree and betweenness. In-degree captures the number
of links each subject receives, therefore it is reﬂecting the individual “stock”
of social capital. Betweenness measures the centrality of each subject, that
is how relevant is each individual within the complete network. Given that
this measure is a combination of in—degree and out—degree, the individual
might aﬀect this variable through the number of links that he declares.
Columns [1] and [2] in Table 1 explore the role of in—degree on PGG ﬁrst
round contributions. We also used in-degree2 to capture possible nonlinear
eﬀects. We have included a dummy to control for gender eﬀects (those un-
related to women’s social type). The result is that those who receive more
l i n k s- t h o s ew h oh a v em o r ef r i e n d s -a r em o r ep r o n et oc o n t r i b u t e . T h ee f -
fect is even more signiﬁcant in regression [2], when the variable in-degree is
squared. Therefore, we may conclude that those subjects who receive more
links contribute more in the ﬁrst round.










female -16.09 -17.36 -15.54 -16.30
(0.11) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10)
constant 30.26 29.82 37.12 35.26
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.16
(*) N=48; p-values between brackets.
Similarly, columns [3] and [4] explore the eﬀect of centrality. We use
betweenness and betweenness2. Results are identical to those reported for
25in—degree: more central subjects contribute signiﬁcantly more.
Hence, both measures of social integration capture the same eﬀect: social
subjects are more prone to contribute in the ﬁrst round of a PGG. Figure
5, shows the average contribution for the whole sample (“all”o nt h el e f t ,
n =4 8 ) and the average contributions for subsequent re-samplings according
to the level of socialization:28all − i(0,..,j− 1) denotes the set of subjects
with an in-degree of at least j.
































This ﬁgure conﬁrms the result showed in the previous regression analy-
sis. When those subjects with smaller number of friends are progressively
28Note that “all - i(0)” includes the whole sample with the exception of those who did
not receive any link (n =4 4 ); “all - i(0,1)” when the sample contains those subjects
with at least 2 received links (n =3 5 ); “all - i(0,1,2)” for subjects receiving at least 3
links (n =2 1 ); “all - i(0,1,2,3)” for subjects receiving at least 4 links (n =1 0 ); “all -
i(0,1,2,3,4)” for subjects receiving at least 5 links (n =8 ) and, ﬁnally, “all - i(0,1,2,3,4,5)”
includes only those who received 6 links (n =3 ).
26removed from the population, then the (average) ﬁrst round contribution in
the PGG increases substantially: more social subjects are willing to con-
tribute more in the PGG.
We may interpret the above result using the theoretical framework de-
veloped in the previous section. Social subjects are more optimistic about
the probability of interacting with players they care about and who (since
social networks show assortativity) would be also optimistic in this respect.
This optimism is rational and leads to cooperation in equilibrium. Thus, the
levels of socialization may be at the heart of the observed players’ attitudes
concerning cooperation in games.
The literature has also documented that contributions decay over time.
Then, given that social subjects are more prone to start contributing, the key
question is whether this sort of “wishful thinking” would survive to experi-
ence: when the individual has received some feedback about other players’
contributions.
Columns [1] to [4] in Table 2 present the regression analysis (Table 1) but
now for second round contributions.










female 14.64 13.69 16.40 15.48
(0.11) (0.15) (0.08) (0.10)
contributiont−1 0.45 0.42 0.50 0.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
feedbackt−1 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06)
R2 0.56 0.59 0.61 0.60
(*) N=48; p-values between brackets.
28As independent variables we use individual’s past contribution (t − 1)
and the proﬁt earned in the previous stage (private + public earnings).29 In
addition, we control for gender eﬀects. The four reported regressions give
the same message: once past contributions and feedback are controlled for,
the individual level of socialization loses any predictive power.
We see that the eﬀect of in-degree and betweenness completely vanish in
the second round, once subjects have updated their beliefs.
This is consistent with the prediction of our model. In a separating equi-
librium, the social type is revealed and even social subjects stop contributing
in the second stage if they have observed a bad signal.
There are two policy implications from there results:
1) The level of social integration among the participants may help the
promotion of public projects.
2) But, the success of these projects crucially depends on the interaction
between socially skilled and unskilled agents.
29Observe that the constant becomes not signiﬁcant when we introduce contributiont−1.
295 Discussion
O u rm a i nr e s u l ti st h a tt h ep o s i t i o ni nas o c i a ln e t w o r km a ya ﬀect a player’s
behavior when he interacts (anonymously) with other players and that the
structural properties of friendship networks aﬀect cooperative behavior.
It is commonly believed that a random matching of subjects in the lab-
oratory would eliminate any peer eﬀects. However, we have shown that the
f a c tt h a tt h eg a m ei sp l a y e da n o n y m o u s l y ,i . e .s u b j e c t si g n o r et h ei d e n t i t yo f
the partners, and that the game is not played in the network, do not cancel
the peer eﬀects (see footnote 3).
We develop a theoretical framework which allow us to interpret the exper-
imental results as the outcome of a separating Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We also provide experimental evidence relating the level of social integration
(betweenness, in-degree) to the level of contributions. The strong positive
association between contributions and social integration supports our in-
terpretation. Our approach may be useful to explain cooperation in other
contexts.
We use a two-step experimental design: ﬁrst, using a coordination game
we elicit the latent social network; second, subjects play an anonymous re-
peated PGG. Using the data of both experiments we check if individual social
30integration is correlated to contributions in the PGG.
Our experimental analysis provides two central results: more social sub-
j e c t sc o n t r i b u t em o r ei nt h eﬁrst round; this eﬀect disappears in the second
round. This observation is consistent with our model’s prediction that so-
cially skilled players would follow a conditional cooperation strategy and after
a negative feedback they would stop contributing.
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355.1 Appendix 1. Brañas-Garza et al. (2007) mecha-
nism
The elicitation protocol is as follows. Students are asked to reveal the names
(and surnames) of their friends within their undergraduate class and, using
a scale from 1 to 4, the strength of each relationship.30
Let sij deﬁne the strength given by i to the ij relationship; the stregth is
framed in the experimental instructions as follows:
sij =1 : j is an acquaintance of i;
sij =2 : j is a close acquaintance of i;
sij =3 : j is a friend of i;
sij =4 : j is a close friend of i.
Finally, if subject i does not name subject j, we set sij =0 .
As for the outcome function of the mechanism, subjects would receive a
prize under these two CASES:
• CASE 1: if they did not name anybody, or
• CASE 2: if they named at least one subject, and the following two
conditions hold:
30Note that in Spain individuals have always two surnames (instead of only one as is
usual in other countries).
36Condition 1 For each subject i one out of the elicited links would be se-
lected at random (with equal probability). Let ˆ j denote the subject
named in the randomly selected link. For subject i to receive the prize
it is necessary that ˆ j has also named her (i.e. that sˆ ji 6=0 ) ;
Condition 2 To obtain the prize, the friendship strength should also be
accurate in that the diﬀerence in strength should not be higher than
1: Diˆ j = |siˆ j − sˆ ji| ≤ 1.
CASE 1 corresponds to a ”privacy-respectful” clause (subjects may not
reveal the names of their friends and still get the prize); CASE 2 corresponds
to the coordination protocol, similar to that of MRQ.
375.2 Appendix 2.









all i such with ki < k.
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Proof of Proposition 1. We start with optimal actions at the second
stage for player 1 (for player 2, the same results apply by changing the labels).
1. k1 < k.
(a) Case (a1
1,a 1
2)=( C,C). Then, k2 ≥ k and a2
2 = C. Expected













1,C holds if and only if (1) is satisﬁed.
(b) Case (a1
1,a 1
2)=( D,C). Then, k2 ≥ k and a2
2 = D. Expected
38utilities of player 1 at period 2 are:
U
2













1,C holds under (1).
(c) Case (a1
1,a 1
2) ∈ {(C,D),(D,D)}. Then, k2 < k and a2
2 = D.
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results from lemma 2.
2. ki ≥ k.
(a) Case (a1
1,a 1
2)=( C,C). Then, k2 ≥ k and a2
2 = C. The expected



















while if he chooses a2

















1,D which holds under condition (3).
(b) Case (a1
1,a 1
2) ∈ {(C,D),(D,D)}. Then, k2 < k and a2
2 = D.
Expected utilities of player 1 at period 2 are:
U
2


















≤ 1/2 in (4).
(c) Case (a1
1,a 1
2)=( D,C). Then, k2 ≥ k and a2
2 = D. Expected





























1,D holds under condition (3).
At the ﬁrst stage, we consider the following scenarios for player 1:
































































1,C is equivalent to (2).


























































































































1,D holds if (4) holds.
425.3 Appendix 3: main data
Table A1: Main Data
43